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Intense battles within the trade union movement over ideology and strategy are an
integral part of Canadian working-class history throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Those debates were often intertwined with the history of the
left, a fractious category that included divergent groups of revolutionaries and
reformists, social democrats, and communists, who might disagree vehemently
with each other, while embracing a similar conviction that leftists should be
involved in the labour movement. Undoubtedly, the most dramatic instance of
intra-left struggle within the trade union movement occurred during the Cold War,
as social democrats and their allies led a largely successful campaign to remove
known and suspected communists—and the unions they led—from trade union
centrals like the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and the Canadian Congress
of Labour (CCL). The intense Cold War battles fought roughly between 1946 and
1956, however, had deep roots in the interwar period, and they also had repercus-
sions for labour long after ‘communist’ unions had been expelled form the TLC
and CCL.
This article explores one as yet undocumented Cold War battle fought
within the Canadian International Fur and Leather Workers Union (IFLWU), with
a particular focus on the Toronto labour scene. Canada’s Cold War in fur was
shaped by international union politics, fierce ideological differences, state policies
on both sides of the 49th parallel, and the ethnic contours of the workforce. While
the general parameters of the Cold War battle within the fur industry were similar
across the country, Toronto was distinct: dual unions existed in the city from the
late 1930s to the 1950s, the Toronto divisions were particularly sharp and violent,
and the anti-communist Toronto union played a significant role in the Cold War
merger of fur workers into the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workman
Union (AMC) in 1955.1
How Cold War politics unfolded in fur had much in common with other
anti-communist union battles: these were largely leadership rather than rank and
file battles, and ideological differences were not honestly debated but instead
became caricatured hyperboles. At the same time, the fur conflict was distinct
because of its nationalist angle and its ensuing consequences. Unlike the electri-
cal workers, there were not two rival unions created in Canada, and unlike the
International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers, fur workers did not man-
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age to sustain an autonomous national presence in Canada. Nonetheless, the
IFLWU battle encapsulated the tragic irony of the Cold War in labour quite well.
Continually invoking democracy as their guide, anti-communist trade unionists
knowingly abandoned democratic and just practices in order to achieve their polit-
ical goals, though in the final analysis, communists too abandoned democratic
union decisions for Communist Party priorities. Moreover, by targeting not only
communists, but also those who refused to shun them, trade union leaders creat-
ed a broader Cold War ‘chill’ within the labour movement, encouraging an atmos-
phere of conformity, unquestioning acceptance of Canadian foreign policy, and a
suspicion of oppositional militancy from the rank and file.
Cold War Labour History
The Cold War within the labour movement was primarily a long-standing contest
between communists, including members of the Communist Party of Canada
(CPC, and known after 1943 as the Labour Progressive Party, or LPP), and social
democrats and liberal reformers, given strong leadership by the CCF-affiliated
unionists. These divisions were obviously intertwined with broader international
and North American Cold War politics. While Canada may not have witnessed the
same public outings, imprisonments, and use of the electric chair as in the United
States (US), Canadian communists were certainly persecuted, though often away
from public view. As Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse’s research shows, anti-
communist purges permeated everything from the National Film Board to the civil
service, peace, educational and reform organizations, and of course unions.2 The
Cold War also shaped immigration policy, and thus the emerging workforce;
potential immigrants with suspected communist tendencies were denied entry, yet
in the aftermath of World War II, the state turned a blind eye to former fascists.3
The most critical Cold War opponents contend that the state manufactured scares,
ignored civil rights, and used anti-communism as a means of crushing anti-capi-
talist and anti-NATO dissent.4 Finding a middle ground, Reginald Whitaker and
Steve Hewitt conclude that there was indeed some security risk from the USSR,
but that Canada’s ‘insecurity’ state purposely exaggerated this as a means of silenc-
ing dissent, and in the process, rode roughshod over the lives of those targeted.5
Trade unions were central to the Cold War, and indeed, the Cold War was
one element of the post-war Fordist accord between capital and the mainstream
labour movement.6 Since communists and social democrats both saw influence
within the house of labour as a sine qua non of their political success, unions
became the site of intense internal political struggles. Scholars exploring the Cold
War in Canadian working-class history initially focussed on internal trade union
politics, and later widened their purview to other organizations, such as women’s
trade union auxiliaries, consumer groups, and the peace movement. Very few
Canadian authors examining the impact of the Cold War on labour suggest that
Cold War in Fur 11
Left History 13_2FinalTextQuark  3/20/09  1:44 PM  Page 11
the purges were a “necessity”7; more often, they contend that the long-term con-
sequences were negative for the entire labour movement. Irving Abella’s 1973
study of the CCL remains an insightful analysis of labour’s Cold War. While he
reproaches social democrats for their abandonment of “truth and justice” in their
relentless campaign against communist unionists, he is also critical of Communist
Party policies.8 New Left historians have also attempted to rewrite communist
labour history in North America without the blinkers of Cold War ideology, often
by focusing on local, single-issue, and rank and file organizing,9 seemingly less
tainted by Comintern directives. While their sympathetic analyses of a wide range
of communist organizing has contributed important new perspectives, there is a
tendency, as Bryan Palmer points out in a recent review of the historiography, to
simultaneously sidestep unpleasant questions about decisions coming from the
‘centre,’ Party leadership, and Stalinism.10
Most historians are in agreement that the Cold War in labour had reper-
cussions far beyond the few unions deemed ‘communist.’ In the TLC, according
to Whitaker and Marcuse, anti-communism was used to help the AFL successful-
ly suppress nationalist claims for autonomous Canadian decision making, purging
unionists who would “not toe the internationalist line.”11 Furthermore, independ-
ent socialist, even civil libertarian positions, became very difficult to sustain in this
highly polarized atmosphere since all trade unionists who refused to join the anti-
communist crusade were deemed equally suspect. When communists and their
“sympathizers” were barred as delegates from TLC meetings, for example, those
who expressed concern about this undemocratic practice were simply dismissed as
naive—or worse, supporters—of revolutionaries who were “evil destroyers of
democracy and freedom” and “saboteurs” to boot.12 The CCL campaign was sim-
ilarly hyperbolic: their newspaper continually propagandized against communists,
deemed to be “anti-Christian, godless, materialistic, disloyal, and a menace to
democracy.”13 Even though social democratic leaders were the predominant vic-
tors in these battles, McCarthyism could in turn be used against them by anti-
socialist crusaders.14 In the final analysis, conclude Reginald Whitaker and Steve
Hewitt, the CCF did much to support the Cold War, but “the Cold War did noth-
ing for the CCF”15 as it suffered the fallout from anti-socialist campaigns waged in
the name of anti-communism.
The state was not a neutral bystander in labour’s Cold War. While some
appointed bodies like labour relations boards had to appear neutral, the state was
sympathetic to anti-communist unionists; it offered ideological support, and in
specific cases such as the Canadian Seaman’s Union or Maurice Duplessis’ Quebec
government, it intervened to facilitate the removal of communists from the union
movement.16 Imagined enemies of the state were not only trade unionists and left-
ists, but in the civil service they might also be homosexuals supposedly more like-
ly to succumb to the insidious blackmail of foreign agents circulating in Ottawa.
As Elaine Tyler May and John D’Emilio argued some time ago, the interconnec-
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tions between the Cold War and gender, particularly the exaltation of heterosexu-
ality and the heteronormative family, are quite significant.17 The question of gen-
der is particularly important in union histories since some US feminist historians
contend that we have exaggerated the conservatism of the Cold War period in
women’s labour history, when in fact the post-World War II era saw an increase in
union equity campaigns on women’s behalf.18 Lisa Kannenberg, in contrast, still
maintains that the Cold War suppressed the unionization of women workers and
stifled discussion of equality issues within the larger movement.19
The Canadian Cold War in labour was distinct from that of the US: we
did not contend with the same ‘race’ questions that enveloped organizing in the
US South; a few communist-led unions survived here without the terror of a Taft-
Hartley law; and, at least in the case of the fur workers, the communist issue in
Canada was linked to nationalist debates about Canadian union autonomy from US
union leadership. Nevertheless, we cannot extricate our history from that of the
US, since anti-communist battles were played out within the intricate politics of
international unions that were essentially under American leadership control. This
was precisely the case for fur workers whose union, the International Fur and
Leather Workers Union20 came to its end during the Cold War.
Interwar battles in fur 
Just as the insecurity state was rooted in a pre-Cold War past, so too was the inter-
union and intra-union conflict that characterized the Cold War struggles in fur
unions. Long before the iron curtain fell, antagonistic divisions existed in the trade
union movement that reflected different conservative, liberal, social democratic
and communist perspectives. To understand the vehemence of the Cold War in
fur, it is necessary to look briefly at the nature of the industry and fur union pol-
itics during the interwar years.
Fur production was characterized by a high number of small workplaces:
in 1949, for example, there were 642 manufacturers in the country, concentrated
mainly in Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montréal, and with a workforce that included a
large number of Eastern European Jewish immigrants. Some local meetings and
papers were in Yiddish, and the few remaining membership lists for Winnipeg
indicate the geographical and social clustering of what was likely a strong Jewish
union membership.21 This ethnic pattern was somewhat different in Montréal,
where French Canadians also worked in the shops, and in Toronto, where non-
Jewish and Jewish workers actually had different locals at one point, causing some
tension, particularly since the Jewish workers saw their non-Jewish comrades as
more conservative.22
The work process within the industry was segregated more by gender
than ethnicity: the skills required to create coats from pelts were primarily the pre-
serve of men, apprenticed to learn the techniques of sorting, wetting and stretch-
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ing, blocking, and then cutting the skins. Skilled male fur workers, remembers one
former worker of the interwar period, were the “aristocrats” of the garment trade;
Jewish parents were pleased when a young woman chose a “young man in fur” as
her economic future seemed secure.23 In contrast, women worked as sewing
machine operators, made linings, and did the finishing of the coat. As a minority
of the fur workforce, their jobs were designated less skilled and were remunerat-
ed poorly, even when they shared the same operator work as men. In Canada, their
share of these positions also decreased in the post-World War II period, in part
due to the influx of many displaced male fur workers from Europe.24
From the 1920s to World War II, the significant numbers of politicized,
left-wing Jewish immigrants working in fur provided a cadre of union activists, and
despite the gendered division of labour, women shared similar concerns with male
workers about the low wages, contracting out, seasonally long hours, and
unhealthy working conditions (respiratory problems were prevalent) in the indus-
try. Ontario’s Minimum Wage Board records indicate that female sewing machine
operators often received “shockingly low” wages until employers, prodded by
unions, were forced to comply with the law.25 In many respects, the organization
of the fur industry was not unlike the garment trade, and there was some fluidity
in their mutual leadership, as organizers like Muni Taub moved from positions in
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) to the Fur Workers
Union.26
The fur industry posed substantial difficulties for union organizing, not
only because of the prevalence of sub-contracting, the profusion of small work-
places, and the ease with which new businesses were set up, but also because many
anti-union employers were ready to use injunctions, yellow dog contracts, dis-
missals of activists, and strikebreakers to maintain control of their factories.27
Although these employers might also be Eastern European Jews, their cultural
affinity with their workers did not negate their inevitably divergent economic inter-
ests, and their fierce attempts to prevent unionization.28 In Winnipeg, to note only
one example, the union was brought to its knees in the late 1930s after a year-long
and difficult strike that involved hundreds of arrests when the notoriously anti-
union Hurtig Furs successfully sued the union for over two thousand dollars in
damages.29 Two of the most prominent Communist women organizing in fur,
Pearl Wedro and Freda Coodin, emerged from Winnipeg battles in the 1930s only
to find themselves respectively blacklisted and jailed after the strike’s end.30
From the 1920s on, Canadian organizing was also characterized by polit-
ical struggles between social democratic (or anti-communist) and communist fur
workers. Nowhere were these conflicts more acute than in Toronto. The original
Toronto Fur Workers Union was chartered by the AFL/TLC in 1913 and after a
strike in 1923, increased its presence in the industry. By 1926, after a significant
strike in the US in which communists faced down a gangster element, Ben Gold
and other communist leaders took control of the fur workers until they were
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removed by social democrats, with AFL aid, in the late 1920s. Given this social
democratic coup, the Communist Party’s Third Period’s call for dual unions res-
onated well with American communist fur workers, though in Canada, inter-union
battles persisted throughout the early 1930s. Nonetheless, the struggle for control
of fur unions was always a cross-border affair, with American leadership contests
and union battles inevitably shaping the Canadian scene.
The consequences of these schisms, and dual unions in general, are a
matter of historical contention.31 These political battles did focus union energies
on acrimonious competitions for leadership control and they sometimes resulted
in attempts to decertify other locals rather than organize new ones—a situation
that only aided employers. The fights between competing Jewish factions, argues
Ruth Frager, may have also alienated other ‘non-aligned,’ non-Jewish workers.32
Fratricide in fur, however, was not only a consequence of the Communist Third
Period of the early 1930s, as dual unions emerged in Toronto during the Popular
Front of the late 1930s. Initiatives from the International office in New York, and
the new Communist line of ‘uniting to fight fascism’ helped to push the two sides
together under one union roof, and from 1935 to 1937, a brief period of harmo-
ny prevailed. The Toronto peace pact soon fell apart, and a breakaway fur work-
ers union, led by social democrat Max Federman, was chartered directly under the
AFL in 1938 (a relative rarity), with the blessing of AFL president, William
Green.33
No one was more important to the long history of the Cold War in fur
than Max Federman. A Jewish Polish immigrant who immigrated to Canada at
nineteen, Federman found work in the fur industry in 1920, and by the end of the
decade, he had moved into the leadership of the social democratic fur faction in
Toronto. His right-hand supporter was Harry Simon, a Ukrainian Jewish immi-
grant who arrived in Canada in 1921; by age nineteen, in 1928, he had been elect-
ed business agent of his fur local. Both were committed social democratic union-
ists; both were supporters of Poale Zion, or Labour Zionism, a group that advo-
cated the “mobilization of the proletariat to a Zionist revival” intended to secure
a homeland for Jews in Israel.34
By the late 1930s, therefore, an AFL (social democratic) and CIO (com-
munist) union in Toronto competed for members, territory, and over union prop-
erty35: the contest was intense, violent, and unrelenting. Though bitter personal
hatreds emerged, we should not reduce the Cold War only to sectarian struggles
and petty politics. Social democrats and communists did have different views on
foreign policy, divergent understandings of socialism, and varied cultural-ethnic
identities. Indeed, the case of fur reminds us to be wary of homogenizing any one
ethnic group for divisions were intense within a cadre of Jewish unionists. While
Federman saw religious practice, Jewish culture, and Zionist support for a Jewish
homeland as interconnected, elements of identity, his Jewish communist oppo-
nents’ sense of ethnicity was based on a cultural, though definitely secular identi-
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ty. They portrayed themselves as more ‘internationalist’ in orientation, interested
in class solidarity rather than a Jewish national state. During the early 1930s, for
instance, communists opposed Zionism, labelling it a fascist and capitalist enter-
prise and thus creating even more political animosity between the two left camps
in fur. While communist opposition to the creation of a Jewish state was moder-
ated after World War II, a lingering antipathy to Zionist organizations remained.36
During the thirties, remembered Al Hershokovitz, a communist fur
organizer who subsequently left the Party in the late 1940s (becoming Federman’s
assistant), there were “hot battles in the streets” for control of union territory.37
Mirroring earlier patterns in the American fur industry, these struggles sometimes
involved paid protectors or hired gangsters. In one confrontation, Federman’s
supporters attacked the communists, taking baseball bats to a car and chasing
opponents down Spadina Avenue. In the trial that followed in a Toronto court, it
was ascertained that the “strong arm men” hired by Federman had criminal
records, were not fur workers, and were promised cash in return for their servic-
es.38 Federman’s AFL union countered with its own accusations, claiming
“Communist hoodlums” attacked a union meeting at a member’s house, “brutal-
ly” assaulting his wife. Both sides routinely charged the other with employing vio-
lent tactics, intimidating workers, collaborating with the bosses, and ignoring con-
tracting out when it suited them. Given the incomplete historical records, it is dif-
ficult to assign blame to only one side, though it seems that only the social democ-
rats were taken to court. One thing is certain: these battles took on a masculine
air of bravado and bullying. While activist female fur workers were not shy about
blocking workplace doors and physically intimidating scabs during strikes, they
were usually absent from all-out union rumbles, and the prevalence of this vio-
lence undoubtedly played a role in marginalizing them from the leadership of the
union.
As in the later Cold War, these struggles were waged most decisively at
the upper levels by leaders who often chose to disregard workers’ interests. The
brief attempt at unity fell apart because Max Federman and Harry Simon were
charged by the US head office with fraud. While their self-appointed union com-
mittee cleared them, the international ILFWU (admittedly including their oppo-
nents) found them guilty and fired them. Federman claimed the charges were
nothing but political retribution,39 and then managed to secure his own directly-
chartered AFL local, creating dual unions in the city. Left to sort out the mess in
fur, The Toronto District Labour Council (TDLC), with the aid of labour lawyer
J.L. Cohen, investigated and concluded that the creation of fake worker entries had
been made in the unemployment benefit account book, creating a secret fund then
used by the Federman group, with the checks cashed by a local poolroom propri-
etor who testified that he got a few cents and promise of a job in the fur shops
for one of his relatives.40 Federman admitted to some parts of the scheme but
argued that the funds were used for organizing work in Montreal. Simon and
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Federman cried “bogus trial,”41 but the Labour Council decided there was ample
evidence of guilt; even Al Hershokovitz, later Federman’s right hand man, claimed
in retrospect that he had been playing “hanky panky” with the books.42
The declaration of war in 1939 shifted the political terrain dramatically,
as the Communist Party’s defense of the Hitler-Stalin pact now put them on the
moral defensive. So too did the internment of communist union organizers like
the ILFWU’s Muni Taub. In a trade so heavily populated by Jews, excusing the
Hitler-Stalin pact was a political liability to say the least, though some committed
Stalinists like Taub defended it, even years later.43 The AFL union used the
Communists’ about face to full advantage, often appealing to both employers and
workers on the basis of Jewish fears of antisemitism.44 The communist union,
they claimed, had abandoned the fight against the Nazis; voting for Joe Salsberg,
said one of their pamphlets, endorsed by the Canadian Jewish Congress, was like
voting for Hitler or Goebbels.45 Most anti-communist propaganda never men-
tioned gender, appealing to workers primarily on the basis of their loyalty as
Canadian citizens, or as Jews fighting anti-Semitism, but it is revealing that Pearl
Wedro was pilloried in terms that also mocked her appearance. Whoever appoint-
ed this “Stalinist fish wife” to a leadership position, asked the AFL union con-
temptuously, perhaps another small indication of the masculinist mindset that was
deeply ingrained in the union.46 The AFL union also threatened fur employers,
telling them not to sign any agreements with the CIO union as its leadership was
simply a “fifth column” of Stalinist agents supporting Nazism.47 Should they dis-
obey, they would be exposed publicly as ‘traitors.’ When the USSR joined the war,
these attacks declined but the political antagonisms in fur simply festered for the
remaining war years.
The Cold War 
For a fleeting moment, the IFLWU might have felt optimistic at the war’s end. Fur
workers used the wartime labour situation to organize more locals and obtain bet-
ter contracts, and with the aid of their union counsel, J.L. Cohen, the IFLWU uti-
lized the regulatory powers of the War Labour Board to consolidate union gains.
Workers now enjoyed a 44 hour week, a week’s vacation, a closed union shop, and
contract clauses on the fair distribution of work. In Toronto and Winnipeg,
women’s union auxiliaries were founded; a short-lived publication of the CIO
union, The Beaver, was initiated; and there were new efforts to organize tanneries.
American IFLWU president, Ben Gold, who was given to lecturing Canadian
unionists from time to time, urged the Toronto IFLWU organizer, communist
Fred Collins, to expand on these gains and beef up the union’s grass roots organ-
ization by bringing in “the leather workers, holding educationals, classes, lectures
and concerts.” In Gold’s view, things could only improve in Toronto as the past
leadership had proven either “incompetent or dishonest.”48
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However, as the Cold War heated up, cooking the books seemed a lesser
evil in comparison to the Soviet Union in the eyes of both the CCL and the
American AFL leadership, who identified Max Federman as their key ally against
communist trade unionism. The Canadian IFLWU was expelled from the CCL in
1950 on the pretext that they had criticized the CCL leadership on the issue of
wage and price controls,49 but essentially because of its communist leadership. The
general process of excising communists from the labour movement was similar
across many unions. Propaganda in the union press often laid the groundwork for
expulsions, and it was generally the leadership, rather than the rank and file, who
initiated these expulsions, sometimes disguising their true ideological motives with
other justifications. These were also complex cross-border affairs, characterized
occasionally by antagonistic US-Canada union relations, but more predominantly
by cooperation between anti-communist labour leaders. The nature of the indus-
try and union did have some bearing on the process: unlike influential mass pro-
duction unions like the UAW, where both communist and social democratic/liber-
al factions had considerable power, the ILFWU had no internal anti-communist
opposition to nurture into the leadership, so expulsion was the quick and preferred
option.
At precisely the moment the IFLWU was expelled, it had to cope with an
industry in economic trouble as fur sales were in a slump after 1949. The ILFWU
struggled on independently, though it also faced raiding attempts by the AFL fur
union, hoping to expand into Winnipeg and Montreal—appealing to younger
Montreal workers, claimed one IFLWU official with disgust, with a combination
of anti-communism and “booze parties.”50 The AFL fur union tried to entice
workers away from the IFLWU by stressing two issues: it claimed to be far supe-
rior at bargaining, (though there is not the evidence to support this), and it relent-
lessly pressed home a patriotic appeal: “we know that you are loyal Canadians and
that you believe in the Canadian way of life. We don’t blame you for the swindles,
sellouts....the espionage work for the Soviet Union.”51 Meanwhile, in the US, court
cases launched against the international president, Ben Gold, an open Party mem-
ber, were severely crippling the IFLWU. When Gold resigned, the new leadership
considered a new home, though ironically, it was a change in Communist policy in
the early 1950s, namely a new directive that union members try to find refuge in
the “mainstream”52 of the labour movement, that also pushed the fur workers into
a merger with the A M C. The result was the largest Cold War battle in the union ye t .
The Canadian IFLWU District 10 was automatically expected to partici-
pate in the merger, even though the absence of a Taft-Hartley law here made their
situation different. Ben Gold recognized this when he gently chided Canadians for
not being brave enough in the face of McCarthyism: “we have been under fire all
along...you have had it easier.”53 Yet in Montreal, the Canadian union faced simi-
lar state persecution. In 1954, Maurice Duplessis introduced legislation that essen-
tially mimicked Taft-Hartley, decreeing that unions with communist officers would
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be denied standing with the Labour Board—putting all IFLWU contracts in jeop-
ardy.54 The IFLWU President, Robert Haddow, a Communist, and machinist by
trade, feared this would mean the union’s “destruction,”55 in Quebec, and the
Montreal IFLWU did become legally independent from the International as a
defensive measure.56
Still, Communist Party advice to abandon independent unions like the
IFLWU was geared more towards the American situation, as the fear of intensi-
fied legal persecution, along with the impending AFL-CIO merger, shaped the
decision to find a safe haven in the AFL-CIO. It did not really matter that the
Canadian labour situation was somewhat different: the Canadian Party was of lit-
tle concern to Soviet and Cominform57 advisors, the Canadian IFLWU was a mere
3500 members, and it was simply assumed that key trade union decisions were
made at head offices in the US.
Since the AMC had recently been granted the jurisdictional rights to
leather workers by the AFL, and was already raiding some IFLWU locals, a merg-
er was seen as one way to preserve fur and leather worker locals. Confidential dis-
cussions began in the fall of 1954, before Ben Gold was completely ousted, led by
the long-time ILFWU Vice-President, Abe Feinglass, who had left the Communist
Party six years previously. A merger agreement was hammered out and presented
in December 1954 to the AFL Executive Council, and in January to Canadian and
American IFLWU representatives meeting in special convention. The convention
document was purposely sugar coated: the merger was justified by the Fur
Workers’ long-standing political commitment to “labor unity” and rationalized
with claims that the autonomy, assets, and rights of locals would be respected.
Union leaders told the delegates that signing anti-Communist affidavits and ban-
ning Ben Gold forever was a “weakness” in the pact to be sure, but not too great
a price to pay for unity.58
Selling the merger to fur workers was not initially difficult for Feinglass,
and AMC leaders Patrick Gorman and Earl Jimerson were also solidly behind the
deal—and why not, with the prospect of 70, 000 new members, and substantial
assets, including a 1.3 million resort property in upstate New York?59 Getting the
AFL’s necessary approval, however, proved to be an uphill battle. The AMC pre-
sented the merger to the AFL as a “new and dynamic” strategy for combating
communism: rather than expelling whole unions, leaving all these workers at the
ideological mercy of their leaders, this merger would “amputate the tentacles of
the Communist octopus” by integrating workers into the AMC where their loyal-
ties would be “remolded.”60 Over the next six months, as AMC leaders appealed
repeatedly to the AFL Executive Council to secure their approval, a pattern
became clear: every time AFL President George Meany objected to the merger,
claiming there were still communists in the IFLWU who were just looking for a
devious way to hide in the AFL, the AMC revised the merger plans to provide
more authoritarian, drastic guarantees of “de-communization.” They agreed that
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any “communist” activity by members could lead to expulsion of the local, that
communists were to be barred from future election, that the new AMC Fur
Department would be under the close grip of the AMC Executive, and that expul-
sions could take place even without a trial. In turn, Feinglass and the AMC lead-
ers pressed downward on all the IFLWU locals, expelling suspected communists
and even going to the ridiculous length of banning any participation in the New
York City May Day parades!
There is some evidence that these AMC leaders did not expect such
strong AFL directives and grew disheartened by the ferocious extent of this witch
hunt. Feinglass was rather dismayed when members were expelled for attending
May Day demonstrations, while Gorman privately complained to some other
union heads about the “tommyrot” of AFL hypocrisy on de-communization, and
about the “evil influence” of ILGWU President David Dubinsky who had ‘want-
ed fur for himself,’ and who was behind the AFL objections.61 In public, howev-
er, they joined the incessant calls for the elimination of all communists from the
labour movement, they provided information to HUAC, and they cooperated with
Meany’s special anti-communist envoy sent to keep an eye on them.62 Meany him-
self was under pressure from other AFL leaders who were skeptical that “surface
changes” in the IFLWU would “eliminate” all the resident communists, whom
they envisioned as “traitors to their fellow man, to their country, and to their
God.”63 The AFL’s suspicions of the IFLWU were not surprising considering that
communist newspapers on both sides of the border were actually in favour of the
merger; in May of 1955, the Canadian Tribune extolled it as a “new era for labour.”64
When the merger was first announced in Canada, it was heartily endorsed
by IFLWU District president Haddow. Max Federman, in contrast, headed for the
AFL Executive Council meeting in Miami in February of 1955, to tell them that
his AFL-chartered union resolutely opposed the merger as the IFLWU was con-
trolled by communists, “a cancer” that he had battled for “35 years of his life”; he
even claimed that Feinglass was still a communist in disguise.65 Accusations about
Feinglass were treated with written guffaws by the AMC leaders: if he is a com-
munist, they joked, he is the most “double crossing communist that ever existed”
because, more than anyone else, he “de-communized” the union.66 Yet, a few
months later, Federman headed south again to appear before the AFL in order to
endorse the merger. Why did his tune suddenly change?  He was promised a seat
on the International Fur Department’s Council, and was essentially reassured that
he would have the upper hand in the union, backed up by AMC leaders.67
Canadian anti-communist trade unionists realized they could finally eliminate their
long-time foes through this merger—and how sweet revenge must have seemed to
Federman and Simon especially. Federman was now so keen on the merger that
he wanted his locals to affiliate immediately, but was held back until the final merg-
er was accomplished.
Before this change of heart, Harry Simon had also objected to the merg-
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er, and to make his point that the IFLWU was controlled by communists, he sent
the AMC leadership (and then on to the AFL) a list of eleven unacceptable lead-
ers and staff members in the union. This blacklist now became the unchanging
template for Canadian purges.68 Canadian Labour Congress President Claude
Jodoin also intervened with similar intentions.69 The secret list operated much like
McCarthy’s, including suspicious people as well as known Party members, and pro-
viding no real opportunity for people to defend themselves. Some on the list were
open Party members, like Haddow, but others like Montreal business agent
Charlotte Gauthier may have simply been unionists who agreed to work with com-
munists. Unaware of the full extent of the blacklist, Canadian communist IFLWU
leaders continued to support the merger through the spring of 1955, faithfully fol-
lowing the Party line. Without a Taft-Hartley Act, they surmised Canadians might
escape signing non-communist affidavits. As Haddow told American leaders,
Canadian unionists “expect to be governed by their own laws....resentment would
result from the stigma of being governed” from abroad.70 AMC and AFL leaders,
however, had a different view of the border. While the Canadian unionists usual-
ly equated the international divide with autonomy, American leaders tended to see
the Canadian District 10 as just another district to be brought into line.
When AMC leaders came to Canada in the spring to sell the merger to
the IFLWU, the latter continued to plea for “Canadian autonomy” and the “right
to differ” over important issues. Haddow’s nationalist speech to the group criti-
cized the overbearing and more reactionary American state and reiterated District
10’s wish to sign on only if they could secure their “traditions....leadership and
autonomy.” American leaders warned that Taft-Hartley might be the price to pay
for the merger, and that this was something any “loyal citizen obeying the law”
should have no qualms about. Americans speeches about loving Canada likely
scored few points, grating on the Canadians’ nerves: “I like Canada,” opined
American leader Marvin Hook, “I like your country, although I have never yet had
time to go fishing here.... We will put everything back that we take out. There is
great potential here, a frontier of resources.” Probably more reassuring was
Feinglass’ claim that the AMC did not intend to “dictate” to the Canadians; he also
reminded them that dual, and duelling, unions were crippling Canadian organizing.
AMC leaders were thus speaking two languages: a tough ‘take it or leave it’ rhet-
oric, and one which reassured by claiming that some vestiges of Canadian sover-
eignty might be salvaged.71 They had at least learned that the Canadian IFLWU
was unlikely to appreciate the maladroit assurance they offered to Harry Simon
that they would insist on the new union being “thoroughly American” with strong
“allegiance to the US [state].”72
As the deadline for AFL approval approached, two groups in particular
got cold feet: New York City (NYC) and Canadian District 10. The AMC was des-
perate to bring them into line, and it may have been easier to do in Canada than
NYC where a larger, powerful fur council—Ben Gold’s power base—had histori-
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cally controlled elections. As pressure mounted on Gorman to get tougher with
communists, he was able to use the Canadians as an example of his anti-commu-
nist credentials. In a series of letters to well-known anti-communist activist Father
Charles Rice (who opposed the merger since he believed the evil communists
would simply hide underground in the union), Gorman assuaged his concerns
when he wrote, “this week we will kick out about five in Canada...and as fast as we
find them, out they go.”73 In fact, Gorman sometimes claimed that Canadian lead-
ers were eliminated before they had actually resigned;74 some Canadians staffers
were dispirited to hear from New York newspapers that they had been let go —
a rather insulting way to receive a pink slip.
The Canadian District balked at the AMC’s renewed demands for leader-
ship resignations, feeling “it is clear that the Amalgamated is willing to pay the
price [for the merger] as long as the sacrifices are made by Canadians.” However,
concessions were made: at a May meeting at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto,
Haddow sat with four US union leaders and watched as they dictated his resigna-
tion. Toronto organizer and communist Dewer Ferguson, in the midst of a union-
ization campaign at a local tannery, followed suit. Haddow publicly urged the
IFLWU to proceed with the merger though he was permitted to “record the view
that our officers were wrong in succumbing to a McCarthyite witch hunt” led by
the AFL and TLC.75 Although other Canadian IFLWU leaders feared that the
union could not withstand a “life and death” struggle with the AFL, talk of a
Canadian secession movement began to circulate. Meany was nonplussed when
informed of the possibility: if this is the “sacrifice” we have to make for a suc-
cessful merger in the US, he commented, we can always regain non-communist fur
workers later.76
After Haddow resigned, the Canadians were still under the impression
that they could salvage some autonomy, but they were wrong. At its May meeting,
the AFL again rejected the merger, and using Simon’s blacklist as their measure,
demanded more purges, something Federman later celebrated as part of his con-
tribution to union history. Canadian locals across the country now protested more
assertively to the AMC; over the summer, their letters and telegrams of “burning
resentment” flooded into the AMC Chicago office. Asserting that no more resig-
nations would be accepted, they denounced the “beheading” of the Canadian dis-
trict, and the violation of democratic rights: we need the right to “form our own
policy in keeping with Canadian needs, to elect our own leaders, to differ when the
national interest is involved,” wrote the Vancouver local.77
To the AMC, these Canadian rumblings of discontent were irksome, but
probably less worrisome than the US situation. In July, the AMC closed in:
Feinglass came to Montreal, “took over the finances, stopped the subsidy, cut off
f u n d s, and put the remaining orga n i z ation on the Intern at i o n a l ’s pay ro l l .”
Hershkovitz, now working for Federman, tried to intercede on behalf of some of
his former comrades but admitted he could do nothing to stop further purges:
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Gorman, he reported, “regretted” the attacks but “Federman and Meany” would
not rest until more leaders resigned.78 On 5 August, a few days before the next
AFL Executive Council meeting, telegrams were sent to four more Canadians on
the Harry Simon list, ordering them to resign. When they refused, their locals
were put into receivership.
Six Canadian locals called an emergency convention on 20 August to
consider seceding as an “autonomous”79 union. Fur workers and their leaders bit-
terly vented their anger: “We were prepared to make peace with Federman on
honourable terms,” they wrote,
“but he demanded the whole organization and Meany agreed…. “The
merger was negotiated without our agreement, consent or consulta-
tion....we got fine speeches about democracy but broken promises.
L e a d e rship was re m oved without our consent, the district was destroye d
. . . f rom day one we we re tre ated like colonials to be dictat e d to.”80
Handing over the union to Federman, they charged, meant sweet deals with
employers and future “intimidation from the US.” Memory of the battles of the
thirties also weighed on their minds: Haddow’s hand written list of the pros and
cons of unity with the AFL fur union had included the word “gangsterism” under
the AFL-Federman column.81 Abe Feinglass appeared at the convention to nip the
secession movement in the bud, but it was ultimately the Communists who did so.
After the convention had vented its nationalist anger, voting for independence
from the AMC, a committee of seven was set up to explore secession. Four of
the IFLWU communist leaders on the committee capitulated, offering their resig-
nations and accepting the merger terms.82
As Communist Party pressure was clearly involved, Federman was con-
temptuous of this latest flip flop.83 Because of the Party’s endorsement of ‘main-
streaming’ as a union strategy, communist leaders in the IFLWU bowed to humil-
iating terms, the abandonment of free union elections, and a purge even Feinglass
termed “ruthless.”84 By the time the AFL Executive met in October, at least two
more on the Canadian list had been forced out. Satisfied that the AMC had thor-
oughly eliminated communist leaders in the IFLWU, the AFL approved the merg-
er, though it was reassured that even more communists would be pushed out of
the union in the future.
Dismissed Communist organizers like Muni Taub and Pearl Wedro
found themselves unemployed and blacklisted. The merger did allow the Montreal
local to safely reintegrate with the International, which it did in 1956. It is ques-
tionable, though, how much was gained for fur workers. In the US, argues Bert
Cochran, the IFLWU benefited little from the merger, and might as well have con-
tinued as an independent.85 In Canada, other communist-led unions which had
been expelled from the CCL did resist mainstreaming: the UE (United Electrical
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Workers) with an independently-minded leadership refused to follow this advice,
and the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers managed to sur-
vive as an independent Canadian entity for some time, despite raiding campaigns
led by the United Steel Workers.86 It is difficult to say if the IFLWU, a much small-
er union, would have survived as well, especially in the face of continuing raids and
a declining industry. Certainly, once the IFLWU embraced mainstreaming as the
only way forward, they were trapped in a merger that knew no end of leadership
purges—though these were also related to the union’s lack of power within the
international, and the existence of the anti-communist, Toronto-based dual union,
which not only provided US leaders with a blacklist, but kept urging them to
implement it. It was a rather ignominious end for the IFLWU, a union with a
proud tradition of skill, militancy, and political activism.
Cold War Consequences 
Nor was the Cold War in fur entirely over. Well into the mid 1960s, the social
democrats and communists sparred within the fur section of the Amalgamated,
though Federman was successful in keeping communists out of the Canadian
leadership. Leadership control by communists was simply replaced by leadership
control by social democrats, aided by the AMC head office which directed who
could and could not run for office in Canada.87 Wedro eventually found a factory
job in Toronto, and once represented her local on the Toronto Fur Board. During
elections, Federman and his leadership routinely put out leaflets denouncing
“oppositionists” like Wedro in virulent anti-communist language, claiming they
were also dangerous “splitters” who opposed the 1955 merger. Hershokovitz was
occasionally targeted by anti-communists, but it was so clear that he had changed
sides that these attacks came to nothing. Joe Salsberg also made a political come-
back after 1956, speaking at fur worker educationals. After renouncing the
C o m munist Pa rt y, he was no longer equated with Hitler by social democratic fur leaders.
The persistence of anti-communism was well illustrated by the case of
Bill Mitchell, who was purged as a Montreal business agent in 1955, but in 1956,
left the Party. He wanted to run for election as business agent in 1957 but the
AMC said no. He had to pass a stringent repentance test that included securing
Meany’s blessing. It would take more than a routine ‘apologia’ letter to do this.
Mitchell could not simply reject the Communist Party; he had to declare that he
“regretted ever being a communist” and denounce all communist ideas, “every-
where.”88 Groveling in anti-communist mea culpas was the price to be paid, and
Mitchell acquiesced. For communists who once devoted all their waking hours to
these ideas, one wonders how they coped psychologically with being pressured to
say their lives had been spent uselessly.
The continuing fear of communism was fanned after the merger by the
Anti-Communist Fur Workers League, a small but vocal US-based group that lob-
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bied for more purges, claiming in their newspaper, The Anti-Communist Fur Workers
Voice, that the union was not sufficiently “cleansed of the communist plague.”
“You can’t get rid of an octopus by cutting off its arms,” they wrote, but only by
removing “the head.” There were some indications that they had links to Max
Federman. Both expressed continuing animosity towards Canadian fur organizer,
Myer Kling, who moved to the US in the thirties to work for the IFLWU. Kling
admitted to spending a few years in the Canadian Communist Party from 1929 to
1932, a confession that haunted him for decades. Referring to Kling as this “ver-
min, Stalinist hatchetman, alter boy of Ben Gold,” the paper claimed he was the
“chief prosecutor against Federman....used to take [communist] control in Canada
[in 1938].”89 If Federman had provided this information, he had mixed up his
prosecutors. The Anti-Communist Fur Workers League continued to provide
blacklists to the AMC, and they lobbied to have Kling deported to the Soviet
Union where they stated he should meet the same Gulag fate as Soviet subversives.
The AMC leadership placated these anti-communist lobbyists, but pri-
vately, they seemed to tire of the witch hunt. They did not fire Kling and paid for
his long legal battle against deportation; at his victory celebration in 1962, Gorman
even criticized the witch hunt waged against him. Central to Gorman’s views on
the Cold War was the concept of repentance, and it is interesting that the AMC’s
anti-communist pledges were accompanied by a required statement of which
church one belonged to. If former communists were sufficiently penitent in word
and deed, they should be welcomed back into unions. Reintegration also became
synonymous with American patriotism. As Gorman had written to Father Rice
about the fur workers: we should “pray for them, we may not be able to make
them Christians, but we can make them Americans”—surely a reference to the
Jewish heritage of many workers.90
By the 1970s, the ethnicity of fur workers in Canada altered as Greek and
other European immigrants became the new work force in the fur industry. The
legacy of the Cold War on the union, however, was still imprinted on the AMC,
later merged into the United Food and Commercial Workers. Federman, who
continued to lead the fur workers, argued at conventions during the 1950s and
1960s that the peace movement was suspect, and that there should be no
“appeasement” of the Soviet Union. He still supported an anti-communist loyalty
oath in the 1970s so that “no member of the Communist Party will ever hold
union office again.”91 He remained committed to Zionism, using the fur union to
advertize his Labour Zionist views.92 Israel, he argued, was the “hope of democ-
racy” in the Middle East, positioned against “reactionary Arab forces.”93 The war
in Viet Nam was also endorsed as a noble cause, a “crusade against communism.”94
Federman was not the only Cold Warrior in the labour movement; more broadly,
some union leaders’ fervent endorsement of Cold War ideology helped to stifle
critiques of American foreign policy, from the Marshall Plan through to the Viet
Nam War, and it also acted as a more general ‘chill’ within the movement on any
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left-wing dissent that, in their minds, bore a resemblance to communism.
Gender and Ethnicity in Cold War Battles 
During this long Cold War in fur, the rival Canadian fur unions were united only
once, in their joint effort in 1947 to rescue five hundred Europeans from displaced
persons camps after the horror of the Holocaust. This effort purposely sought
single male workers, and neither fur union fundamentally challenged the gendered
division of labour and differential wages within the industry. Nor was there con-
cern expressed in the 1950s as women disproportionately lost their jobs as the fur
industry faltered. Although it may appear that the Cold War had the same conse-
quences for male and female workers, a closer examination of new organizing and
equity issues suggests that gender needs to be taken into account.
New organizing did not fall completely by the wayside after the ILFWU
was expelled from the CCL; the union held their own, even as pariahs in the offi-
cial union movement.95 Had it survived, the IFLWU had the potential to reach out
to new immigrants, women, and non-Anglo/non-white workers as it was trying to
extend its base in fur to new locals in tanneries, shoe making, and leather goods,
small workplaces where women were a significant part of the labour force. In
Vancouver, Pearl Wedro organized a string of shoe makers so small in size that she
astutely secured a common agreement to protect all of them.96 In another leather
goods workplace in southern Ontario, Wedro also tried to raise the issue of equal
pay for women workers during the organizing effort.97 After the merger, there is
little indication of continuing organizational fervour for such marginalized work-
ers. Indeed, the AMC, which admitted it was literally ‘made’ with amalgamations,
was now most interested in merging with the large United Packing House Workers
of America. Nor can we discount the fact that fending off Cold War attacks took
up inordinate union time and energy that might have been spent on new union
organizing.98
There was also renewed discussion after war’s end within the IFLWU of
separate women’s committees, designed to train female union leaders and address
issues of equal pay, maternity leave, retention of seniority rights on maternity
leave, and special health protections for women’s work.99 Women’s committees
(for workers) and women’s auxiliaries (for wives of workers) were originally to be
organized jointly, but by 1950, it was suggested they work separately, sharing some
projects such as International Women’s Day.100 Canadian organizers Pearl Wedro
and Charlotte Gauthier were involved in the organization of the international
women’s committee, with Gauthier serving as secretary.101 In Canada, with a small-
er membership base, the union had more success setting up auxiliaries, designed,
as one stated, “to help our men fight for better working conditions and better lives
for our families.”102 Some were involved in respectable local philanthropy,103 but
others addressed political issues, such as women workers’ right to collect UIC on
the same basis as men, and the need for day nurseries.104
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The IFLWU’s efforts to address the specific needs of women workers
may have been, in part, an attempt to secure the loyalty of a minority constituen-
cy in the union in difficult, anti-communist times, though the union agenda also
mirrored a long-standing Communist political platform on women’s equality. One
should not overemphasize a heartfelt commitment to women’s equality in a union
that had been built on masculinist power structures. On hearing a resolution for
more action on equality issues from the women’s committee in 1946, Gold pater-
nalistically acknowledged this little “spanking,” from the women, and he asked that
they add words of praise for the union’s good track record on women’s wages and
status.105 Gender equality may have been more ‘convention talk’ than action, but
the AMC was even less interested in women’s issues. There were no women
organizers in the new AMC in Canada, though Gauthier, originally on the black
list, was later re-hired as the business agent in Quebec, perhaps because of her lan-
guage skills and disavowal of her earlier communist contacts. The union’s 1962
celebration of its history featured pictures of its all-male executive board. Nor
were the specific needs of women workers, or issues like equal pay, discussed in
the Fur Department section of the AMC paper, The Butcher Workman. Admittedly,
assessing the impact of the Cold War on women fur workers inevitably involves
conjecture about a series of ‘mights.’ However, it is clear that women were trans-
ferred to a union without the same tradition of concern about the woman ques-
tion, with a leadership in Canada that disdained democratic process in favour of
political control—and the latter has proven to be key to women’s ability to have
gender equity issues raised in unions.
Conclusion
Cold War battles within the North American labour movement were shaped both
by common, broad influences, but also by historical, regional, and political speci-
ficities. Canada’s Cold War in fur was influenced by the ethnic complexion of the
workplace, by the Canadian IFLWU’s place within the international union, by state
policies (especially the US Taft-Hartley Act), and by the contending political
visions of social democratic and communist politicians. These political con-
tentions were grounded in a long history of conflict, ideological debates, and con-
tests for power earlier in the early twentieth century, and they had an impact after
McCarthyism had abated.
During the Cold War, TLC and CCL unionists became uncritical collab-
orators with both capital and the state in an anti-communist crusade that claimed
to protect democracy for workers, while using undemocratic and authoritarian
methods to do so. They beat the drums of xenophobia, dividing fellow workers
into patriots or traitors, us and them, good and evil. Even if some unionists, like
those in the AMC, were privately dismayed by the ferociousness and irrationality
of the Cold War, they joined in the public denunciations and mouthed the same
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rhetoric. This is not, however, to idealize Communist-led unions, which could also
play fast and loose with democracy, reflecting the earlier Stalinization of commu-
nism.
The Canadian IFLWU managed to remain viable after its expulsion from
the CCL, only to be pushed reluctantly into a merger five years later, in large part
due to Communist party pressure. This is a cogent reminder that attention to
international and national leadership, and Party decisions from the ‘centre’ can not
be excised from our assessments of communist labour organizing. Party politics,
Al Hershkovitz recalled when explaining his exit from the Party, too often
trumped trade union organizing: “it was more important [for the Party] to get 5
Tribune subscribers than 5 cents more for the workers.”106 The Cold War in fur
was distinct from other Cold War union contests because of the extent to which
the merger became wrapped up in questions of Canadian nationalism and auton-
omy within the international—read American—labour movement. In the original
expulsions from the TLC, argue Whitaker and Marcuse, anti-communism was used
to curb Canadian attempts to assert some political autonomy. In the case of the
IFLWU, autonomy was clearly sacrificed to the overall anti-communist goals of
the international union.107 Still, however compelling the IFLWU’s aspirations for
autonomy from Taft-Hartley were, the way in which nationalism was used in this
struggle underscores its many faces: it was not, in itself, a positive force for it
could be used by radicals, democrats, anti-communists, or in this case, rather cyn-
ically by the Communist Party.108
National autonomy may have been the most visible issue at the time, but
in retrospect, the merger also had consequences for women in the IFLWU. The
merger of the IFLWU, with some concern for women’s equality, into the larger
AMC, with almost no interest at all in these issues, meant that an opportunity to
address gender equality in the trade union movement was lost. The ethnic con-
tours of the IFLWU inter-union and intra-union conflict were more complex, and
somewhat distinct, since the Cold War in fur was fought out between two compet-
ing ‘cultural-political’ factions within one ethnic group. The struggle for union
ascendancy between Jewish social democrats and communists is generally inter-
preted by historians as a destructive contest, dividing workers from each other and
inhibiting trade union organizing. While dual unions certainly had negative effects,
we should not dismiss this contest as only narrow sectarianism. For both social
democratic and communists during the long Cold War in fur, winning over mem-
bers to new political ideas was perceived to be a potent means of moving the
process of social transformation forward. Both sides held passionately to their
beliefs, linking them to different visions of socialism. Both sides represented
competing notions of Jewish cultural identity: one secular, stressing class and
internationalism, believing in the success of the multicultural Soviet project, and
one more religious and Zionist, calling for a Jewish state, and deeply suspicious of
the Soviet project. Politics shaped the Communists’ union agenda, but also
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Federman’s, including his Labour Zionism, and the emphasis he placed on practi-
cal bargaining and respectable unionism rather than revolution. Given the current
union movement’s contentious debates about Israel and Palestine, we should prob-
ably be sensitive to the importance of foreign policy issues to these earlier trade
unionists, and also to their commitment to political issues, at home and abroad,
that went beyond bread and butter unionism.
In the aftermath of the merger, the social democratic victors wrote the
history of the union. Every historical speech, newspaper article, and anniversary
program Max Federman created either omitted all communist leaders or grouped
them under blanket denunciations of their nefarious actions. Any chance to
recount the union history was another opportunity to celebrate the victory of anti-
communists over communist “conspirators” who tried to ruin and “destroy” the
union.109 In Federman’s historical writing, events also hinged on his important
interventions110 in the Cold War, so much so that in the 1960s, when he offered to
create a public history for the international, Feinglass and Gorman, rather irritat-
ed, rejected his offer.111
Communists on the losing side created their own personal histories in
which they remained loyal to their communist pasts without really questioning the
Party. Pearl Wedro and Muni Taub struggled later to rationalize the Party’s deci-
sion of 1955, finding some good in it, even though they were both upset at the
time, and Wedro was sympathetic to secession in 1955. Having invested their lives
in the Party, they were unlikely to confront the fact that the union they built had
been sacrificed to a merger of questionable worth. Taub later claimed in an oral
history that the merger as a way to protect a “little union” within the “larger fam-
ily of labour,” but lamented the “undemocratic trampling” of workers rights with
the re m oval of elected leaders — l i ke himself—who we re not even allowed to run aga i n .1 1 2
The destructive impact of the Cold War stretched beyond specific union
b at t l e s, and left an imprint on the broader labour move m e n t , even after
McCarthyism had waned. Two decades of Cold War rhetoric, in which commu-
nists and those who refused to denounce them were endlessly portrayed as a “fifth
column of traitors”113 had a dampening effect on left-wing dissent more generally.
By labeling opponents traitors, spies, and saboteurs, trade union leaders were
attempting to quell a fractious opposition, but this also became a much broader
disciplining project that stifled rank and file dissent and genuine debate. In the
current era, when Cold War-like fears are again prevalent, the need to make ample
room for all forms of dissent, not giving in to a politics of fear, may be one les-
son of the earlier Cold War in fur.
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